PART-6:
PHENOMENOLOGICAL ASPECTS:
The phenomenological aspects[i]
of siddhantham are concentrated in the avathai states. The avathai concepts are
most elaborate in siddhantham as one can see in the thiru-manthiram and sivagnana siddhiyar. The concept of malam is
unique to the avathai states. It is not pronounced in any other hindu schools.They
need very slow process of reading and understanding. This aspect of
phenomenology is most difficult to
simplify and often is controversial to
make bold inferences. Nevertheless I take the liberty due to my psychiatric credentials and go ahead.
6.1 DESCRIPTIVE MENTAL STATES-PHENOMENOLOGY: IN SADHASIVA AGAMAM (THIRUMANTHIRAM):
Let us take some of the verses from the eighth chapter
of the thirumanthiram and see how much elaborate descriptions,classification,
subtyping and details has been done by thirumoolar about the various mental
states(அவத்தைகள்).
SYMPTOMATOLOGY OF MALAM:
AVATHAI (அவத்தை)
The philosophy of existentialism gave
importance to man. it is well seen in hindu schools. In the Cartesian sense the
paradigm is “iam thinking: therefore iam”. In existentialism it is the other
way “iam: therefore I think”. Thereby the individual (and his feelings)is first
and his thinking becomes next. Existentialism in western contexts and eastern
contexts has difference. However the core issue of central importance of man
and his inner experiences are the fundamental importance in both systems.
Modern exponent of existentialism in the
west are Martin Heiddegger, Karl Jasper, and Jean Paul Sartre . They say,
Phenomenology is a study of the mental experiences. It has a descriptive
approach contrary to the explanatory model of psychoanalysis.
The agama of the Jain, Buddhist and Saiva
schools are rich in phenomenology. Let us see how the concept of malam is used
as a phenomenological entity in agama.
The malam causes all the penuries for the
soul. Hence the study of the problems of soul begins with the study of malam.
The malam symptomatology is unque to saiva siddahantham. It is not seen in
other Indian systems of philosophy to this detail. Even though the
Buddhist-jain thoughts do have approach to the problems of mind they are not as
vivid and logical as they are in saivasiddhantham.
The malam
symptomatology are the well
differentiated and the most refined form of tamil-hindu existentialism and
phenomenology. They help us to appreciate the early methodology in the
classification of mental distress and nosology of the mind studies.
Because of the malam the soul suffers. The sufferings
are classified in saiva siddhantha into symptoms. They are called
avathais(avasthais). The avathais are the core concept in agama phenomenology.
The malam are fundamental to the understanding of the
deeper aspects of the soul. The malam are anavam, kanmam and mayai. In
psychodynamic terms anavam is analogous to the affective states, the kanmam to
the psychomotor functions and the mayai to the cognitions.The cognitive,
psychomotor and affective disturbance are the core concepts in psychiatry as
well.
The understanding of the malam and the products of
malam are the basic feature in saivasiddhantha phenomenology. Malam studies
hence form the pivotal role in the assessment of human suffering. The status of
malam in the individual is the status of the particular diagnosis in his or
her soul(mind). The sufferings are
called avathais(avasthai).
Let us see how thirumanthiram explains the processing
of the malam and the various guna, thathva,thathveeha and the conscious
experiences in relation to the malam. The malam thesis manifests with varios
avathais and they are (thirumanthiram)[ii].
Let us see now some of the important verses of the escribed in detail in the
final verses(eighth chapter) of the sadhasiva agamam sadhasiva-agamam in
relation to the avathais.
These verses of
the eigth chapter indeed are the most content laden areas of thirumanthiram
unlike the other chapters. One has read them carefully. I have made the summary
in the end of this part and later in the creation part of the book .
The avathais and their
manifestations are well explained in the subsequent verses. The point is the
conscious, guna, malam, thathva and
thathveehas are systematically treated and
their processing are well
described in thirumanthiram. They are the early available source of
phenomenology in tamil.
The subsequent works
like “Sivagnana Siddhiyar”(சிவஞானசித் தியார்)
have elaborated this but have not changed the core issues that are seen in the
thirumanthiram. Thus the avathai concepts are so well estabilished in 5th
century itself and they have hardly needed any major changes for another 16
centuries. Even the modern theories like object relation theories (1950s)well
correspond to them to day.
The object relation
theories and self psychology schools are were the last frontiers in
psycho-analysis. But they have been the beginning of siddhantham!
[i] Phenomenology is commonly understood in either of two ways:
as a disciplinary field in philosophy, or as a movement in the history of
philosophy.
The discipline of phenomenology may be defined initially as the study of structures of experience, or consciousness. Literally, phenomenology is the study of “phenomena”: appearances of things, or things as they appear in our experience, or the ways we experience things, thus the meanings things have in our experience. Phenomenology studies conscious experience as experienced from the subjective or first person point of view. This field of philosophy is then to be distinguished from, and related to, the other main fields of philosophy: ontology (the study of being or what is), epistemology (the study of knowledge), logic (the study of valid reasoning), ethics (the study of right and wrong action), etc.
In recent philosophy of mind, the term “phenomenology” is often restricted to the characterization of sensory qualities of seeing, hearing, etc.: what it is like to have sensations of various kinds. However, our experience is normally much richer in content than mere sensation. Accordingly, in the phenomenological tradition, phenomenology is given a much wider range, addressing the meaning things have in our experience, notably, the significance of objects, events, tools, the flow of time, the self, and others, as these things arise and are experienced in our “life-world”.
Phenomenology as a discipline has been central to the tradition of continental European philosophy throughout the 20th century, while philosophy of mind has evolved in the Austro-Anglo-American tradition of analytic philosophy that developed throughout the 20th century. Yet the fundamental character of our mental activity is pursued in overlapping ways within these two traditions. Accordingly, the perspective on phenomenology drawn in this article will accommodate both traditions. The main concern here will be to characterize the discipline of phenomenology, in a contemporary purview, while also highlighting the historical tradition that brought the discipline into its own.
Basically, phenomenology studies the structure of various types of experience ranging from perception, thought, memory, imagination, emotion, desire, and volition to bodily awareness, embodied action, and social activity, including linguistic activity. The structure of these forms of experience typically involves what Husserl called “intentionality”, that is, the directedness of experience toward things in the world, the property of consciousness that it is a consciousness of or about something. According to classical Husserlian phenomenology, our experience is directed toward — represents or “intends” — things only through particular concepts, thoughts, ideas, images, etc. These make up the meaning or content of a given experience, and are distinct from the things they present or mean.
The basic intentional structure of consciousness, we find in reflection or analysis, involves further forms of experience. Thus, phenomenology develops a complex account of temporal awareness (within the stream of consciousness), spatial awareness (notably in perception), attention (distinguishing focal and marginal or “horizonal” awareness), awareness of one's own experience (self-consciousness, in one sense), self-awareness (awareness-of-oneself), the self in different roles (as thinking, acting, etc.), embodied action (including kinesthetic awareness of one's movement), purpose or intention in action (more or less explicit), awareness of other persons (in empathy, intersubjectivity, collectivity), linguistic activity (involving meaning, communication, understanding others), social interaction (including collective action), and everyday activity in our surrounding life-world (in a particular culture).
Furthermore, in a different dimension, we find various grounds or enabling conditions — conditions of the possibility — of intentionality, including embodiment, bodily skills, cultural context, language and other social practices, social background, and contextual aspects of intentional activities. Thus, phenomenology leads from conscious experience into conditions that help to give experience its intentionality. Traditional phenomenology has focused on subjective, practical, and social conditions of experience. Recent philosophy of mind, however, has focused especially on the neural substrate of experience, on how conscious experience and mental representation or intentionality are grounded in brain activity. It remains a difficult question how much of these grounds of experience fall within the province of phenomenology as a discipline. Cultural conditions thus seem closer to our experience and to our familiar self-understanding than do the electrochemical workings of our brain, much less our dependence on quantum-mechanical states of physical systems to which we may belong. The cautious thing to say is that phenomenology leads in some ways into at least some background conditions of our experience.
The discipline of phenomenology may be defined initially as the study of structures of experience, or consciousness. Literally, phenomenology is the study of “phenomena”: appearances of things, or things as they appear in our experience, or the ways we experience things, thus the meanings things have in our experience. Phenomenology studies conscious experience as experienced from the subjective or first person point of view. This field of philosophy is then to be distinguished from, and related to, the other main fields of philosophy: ontology (the study of being or what is), epistemology (the study of knowledge), logic (the study of valid reasoning), ethics (the study of right and wrong action), etc.
In recent philosophy of mind, the term “phenomenology” is often restricted to the characterization of sensory qualities of seeing, hearing, etc.: what it is like to have sensations of various kinds. However, our experience is normally much richer in content than mere sensation. Accordingly, in the phenomenological tradition, phenomenology is given a much wider range, addressing the meaning things have in our experience, notably, the significance of objects, events, tools, the flow of time, the self, and others, as these things arise and are experienced in our “life-world”.
Phenomenology as a discipline has been central to the tradition of continental European philosophy throughout the 20th century, while philosophy of mind has evolved in the Austro-Anglo-American tradition of analytic philosophy that developed throughout the 20th century. Yet the fundamental character of our mental activity is pursued in overlapping ways within these two traditions. Accordingly, the perspective on phenomenology drawn in this article will accommodate both traditions. The main concern here will be to characterize the discipline of phenomenology, in a contemporary purview, while also highlighting the historical tradition that brought the discipline into its own.
Basically, phenomenology studies the structure of various types of experience ranging from perception, thought, memory, imagination, emotion, desire, and volition to bodily awareness, embodied action, and social activity, including linguistic activity. The structure of these forms of experience typically involves what Husserl called “intentionality”, that is, the directedness of experience toward things in the world, the property of consciousness that it is a consciousness of or about something. According to classical Husserlian phenomenology, our experience is directed toward — represents or “intends” — things only through particular concepts, thoughts, ideas, images, etc. These make up the meaning or content of a given experience, and are distinct from the things they present or mean.
The basic intentional structure of consciousness, we find in reflection or analysis, involves further forms of experience. Thus, phenomenology develops a complex account of temporal awareness (within the stream of consciousness), spatial awareness (notably in perception), attention (distinguishing focal and marginal or “horizonal” awareness), awareness of one's own experience (self-consciousness, in one sense), self-awareness (awareness-of-oneself), the self in different roles (as thinking, acting, etc.), embodied action (including kinesthetic awareness of one's movement), purpose or intention in action (more or less explicit), awareness of other persons (in empathy, intersubjectivity, collectivity), linguistic activity (involving meaning, communication, understanding others), social interaction (including collective action), and everyday activity in our surrounding life-world (in a particular culture).
Furthermore, in a different dimension, we find various grounds or enabling conditions — conditions of the possibility — of intentionality, including embodiment, bodily skills, cultural context, language and other social practices, social background, and contextual aspects of intentional activities. Thus, phenomenology leads from conscious experience into conditions that help to give experience its intentionality. Traditional phenomenology has focused on subjective, practical, and social conditions of experience. Recent philosophy of mind, however, has focused especially on the neural substrate of experience, on how conscious experience and mental representation or intentionality are grounded in brain activity. It remains a difficult question how much of these grounds of experience fall within the province of phenomenology as a discipline. Cultural conditions thus seem closer to our experience and to our familiar self-understanding than do the electrochemical workings of our brain, much less our dependence on quantum-mechanical states of physical systems to which we may belong. The cautious thing to say is that phenomenology leads in some ways into at least some background conditions of our experience.
[ii]
aTiththalaiyaRiyum
thiRaN^kURal ,aNTAthi pEtham,aththuvAkkaL ,avaththai pEtham kIzAlavaththai
,avAvaRuththal ,aRivuthayam ,ARan^tham ,ilakkaNAththirayam ,uTal viTal ,uTaliR
panjcha pEtham ,upachAn^tham eTTithazk ,amala mukkuNa avaththai ,onpAn
avaththai oNpAn apimAni ,kalavu chelavu ,kAriya ,AraNa upAthi ,kEvala
chakalachuththam ,chuththan^anavAthiparuvam ,chuththA ,chuththam chOthanai
,njAnicheyal ,thaththuva machi vAkkiyam ,n^inmalAvaththai ,pathi pachu pAcham
vERinmai ,pathinOrAn^thAnamum avaththaiyenak kANal ,paththiyuTaimai
,paralaTchaNam ,parAvaththai ,puRaN^kURAmai ,maththiya chAkkirAvaththai
,mukkaraNam ,mukkuNan^irkuNam ,mukkuRRam ,muchchUniyathon^thaththachi
,muchchorUpam ,muththin^iththai ,
No comments:
Post a Comment